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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
As provided by statute, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Is the State of Utah not allowed to record a condemnation judgment which 
is older than eight years? 
2. Can the Estate of Edwin Higley obtain title to the subject property as a 
result of adverse possession against the State of Utah for property not used by the public? 
3. Is the State of Utah liable to reimburse the Estate of Edwin Higley for 
property taxes paid? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard for review for this matter is that the appellate court should give no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and should review the legal conclusions 
reached by the trial court for correctness. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE 
None. 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATIONS ARE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-2-311 
An action may be brought within eight years upon a judgment or decree of 
any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United 
States. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-202(l) 
Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court 
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of a judgment is stayed in 
accordance with law. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-516 
When payments ha\e been made and the bond given, if the plaintiff elects 
to give one, as required b) Sections 78B-6-514 and 78B-6-515, the court 
shall make a final judgment of condemnation, which shall describe the 
property condemned and the purpose of the condemnation. A cop> of the 
judgment shall be filed in the office of the county recorder and the property 
described in it shall vest in the plaintiff for the purpose specified. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-2-201 
The state ma\ not bring an action against any person for or w ith respect to 
any real propert). its issues or profits, based upon the state's right or title to 
the real property, unless: 
(1) the right or title to the propert) accrued within seven years before an) 
action or other proceeding is commenced; or 
(2) the state or those from whom it claims received all or a portion of the 
rents and profits from the real property within the immediately preceding 
seven years. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-2-216 
A person may not acquire b) adverse possession any right in or title to an) 
property held by a town, city, or county and designated for public use as 
streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or any other public 
purpose, unless the town. city, or county has sold, or otherwise disposed of, 
and conveyed the property to a purchaser for valuable consideration, and 
more than seven years subsequent to that conveyance the purchaser or the 
purchaser's grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, 
continuous, and adverse possession of the real estate. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1974 Appellee State of Utah obtained the right to certain properties in Weber 
County from Ed Higley pursuant to a condemnation action. For some reason, the above 
mentioned judgment was not timely recorded with the Weber County Recorder's Office 
at the time of entry with the court. Twenty-nine years later, the State of Utah discovered 
its error and recorded the old judgment on January 16, 2003. During that period of time 
up through and including the time of filing this lawsuit, Ed Higley and his successors had 
paid all the property taxes on the subject property and have possessed, occupied, and used 
the same. The State of Utah failed to renew its judgment in a timely fashion. Appellant 
has caused a Lis Pendens to be recorded regarding the subject property in connection 
with this lawsuit. This Court should find that title to the subject property is to be quieted 
in Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
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(hereinafter "Judgment" See Appendix 1) against Edwin M. Higley, his partner, and their 
wives in regards to a condemnation action brought by the State in order to construct 
Interstate Highway 84 coming out of the canyon from Morgan. R.108 through 114. 
2. The Judgment purports to allow the State of Utah certain parcels of 
property in order to construct the Highway. R. 108-114. 
3. The majority of the property conveyed in the Judgment was in Davis 
County. R. 108-114. 
4. With regard to one of the conveyed parcels, parcel # 80N-6:49:S, the legal 
description included property in both Davis and Weber Counties. R. 113-14. 
5. A plat map from 1998 shows that Edwin M. Higley was the vested owner 
of the property in question (parcel # 071070003). R.118. 
6. According to a similar plat map from 1998, nearby property was also 
shown to belong to Edwin M. Higley as parcel # 071070021. R.l 18. 
7. In 1999 the parcel identified as 071070021 was incorporated into the town 
of Uintah and became Kappos Estates, a residential subdivision consisting of five lots. 
R.119-120. 
8. Based upon a 2001 Weber County plat map, Ed Higley conveyed title to the 
property in Kappos Estates as well as the property just south of the Kappos Estates 
subdivision to third parties Ed Green and Richard Hendrickson. !See. 2001 Plat Map 
identified in R. 121. 
9. The Weber County title records showed that Edwin M. Higley was the 
owner of parcel n 07107UO03 in 2UU2 as per the 2uUZ piai map idenuneu in R. i23. ^ee 
R.l23 and Appendix 2. 
10. On January 26, 2003, 29 years after issuance of the Judgment, the State of 
Utah recorded the Judgment in Weber County against parcel # 071070003. R. 108 
(recording information is on the bottom of said page). See Appendix 1. 
11. During the 29 years between the time that the Judgment was entered and 
the time the State of Utah recorded the Judgment, Edwin Higley and his successors have 
possessed, occupied, used and paid taxes on the subject property. R.96. 
12. Tax records from Weber County show that Edwin M. Higley or his 
successors paid taxes at least through 2004. R. 125 to 153. 
13. In 2005 the Weber County Recorder's Office changed the plat map to show 
that Utah State Road Commission owned parcel # 071070003 based upon the 1974 
Judgment which was recorded in 2003. R. 154. See Appendix 3. 
14. The State of Utah did not renew it judgment within 8 years. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
Judgments in Utah are effective for only eight years and the attempt by the State 
of Utah to record its condemnation judgment 21 years after it had expired is ineffective. 
The State's failure to record the judgment means that the subject property never vested in 
the State of Utah. Although adverse possession against a sovereign for property held for 
the public use is generally not allowed, the subject property was not held by the State of 
Utah for public use and was held for private use. if any. Therefore, adverse possession 
should be allowed against the State of Utah for property not held for the public use. In 
the event that the court disagrees with Appellant on the above two issues then a third 
issue arises which is that the Estate of Edwin Higley should be entitled to reimbursement 
for all property taxes paid to Weber County plus interest during the intervening period. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE JUDGMENTS IN UTAH ARE EFFECTIVE FOR ONLY 
EIGHT YEARS, UDOT'S LATE RECORDING OF THE 1973 
JUDGMENT IS INEFFECTIVE AS AGAINST THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY. 
Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to the property identified as per the 2002 
plat of the Weber County Recorder's Office as identified in Appendix 1 hereto. In 2002 
the Weber County Recorder's Office showed that the subject property belonged to Edwin 
M. Higley. R.123. Because Edwin M. Higley had passed away in 2002, the Estate of 
Edwin Higley brought this action to quiet title to the subject parcel. The basis for this 
quiet title cause of action is that, although the State of Utah obtained a condemnation 
judgment in 1974 for the subject property, it was required to record that judgment prior to 
expiration thereof in order for the title to transfer and fully vest in the State. The State of 
Utah did not need or require the property in question for purposes of construction of the 
Interstate and has had no public need or public use for the property since that time. The 
State of Utah obviously had no reason for use of the property given the fact that the State 
did not record the Judgment in Weber County. The Judgment was recorded in Davis 
County, but not Weber County. 
In the proceedings below, the State of Utah filed a motion for judgment on 
Plaintiffs pleadings under U.R.C.P. 12(c). The trial court ruled on said motion on July 2, 
2007. See Appendix 4. One of the issues decided by the trial court was that the State of 
Utah was not limited to recording the judgment of condemnation to the eight year period 
for which Judgments are enforceable in the State of Utah. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-2-311 provides as follows: "An action may be 
brought within eight years upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, 
or of any state or territory within the United States." Based upon this statute, the State of 
Utah cannot effectively record a judgment in its favor which is 29 years old. The term 
"action" should be interpreted as any affirmative act taken to enforce a judgment 
including the recording thereof The State should not be able to sit around for 29 years, 
fail to record its judgment, while Ed Higley stands by paying taxes on the property and 
using it and then suddenly find a document in its archives that it should have recorded 
and then have all of its rights as if nothing had happened. A rule that allows the State an 
indeterminate period of time to record any condemnation judgments in its favor is 
inequitable to the people of the State of Utah. A rule that allows for the State of Utah to 
be less than vigilant with regard to its property rights does not provide for proper 
accountability. A rule that the State of Utah can record a judgment any time it wants to is 
a free pass to the State government. A rule that gives the State no timeline for recording 
ii^ > juufcuiic-iilo ui ^wiiuCiiinciiioii puts Liic otaic on a separate pid\ing xieiu ironi ail wiiicr 
property owners. 
An important statute is Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-516. This statute provided 
at the time that the trial court decided this matter as follows (previously encoded as Utah 
Code Annotated §78-34-15): 
When payments have been made and the bond given, if the Plaintiff elects 
to give one, as required by Sections 78-34-13 and 78-34-14, the court must 
make a final judgment of condemnation, which must describe the property 
condemned and the purpose of such condemnation. A copy of the 
judgment must be filed in the office of the recorder of the county, 
thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the Plaintiff for the 
purpose therein specified. [Emphasis added]. 
Based thereon, the property under a condemnation action does not vest in the condemnor 
until the condemnation judgment is recorded. The deadline for recording a condemnation 
judgment must necessarily be the effective date of judgments of eight years. A judgment 
of condemnation should not be recordable after eight years. With very minor variations, 
this statute continues to exist today. See. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-516 which 
continues to require the condemnation judgment to be recorded with the county 
recorder's office. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-202 supports the conclusion that the State of Utah 
cannot record a condemnation judgment after eight years. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-
5-202(1) provides as follows: 
Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court 
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of a judgment is stayed in 
accordance with law. 
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enforceable for only eight years. Simply put, the State of Utah did not record the 1974 
Judgment in time and therefore their claim to the subject property much fail. The statutes 
referenced above, interpreted together, necessarily mean that the trial court erred in 
finding that the eight year statute of limitations does not apply to recording of judgments. 
An interesting case from another jurisdiction is Carolina Power and Light 
Company v. Boman, 45 S.E. 2d 531 (North Carolina 1947). In that case, the court 
addressed the issue of a previous condemnation judgment having never been registered in 
the recorder's office. The court determined that under the statutes of the state, 
condemnation judgments are exempt from the requirement of registration and the court 
concluded that the failure to record did not cause the public entity to lose its rights under 
the condemnation proceeding. 
The Carolina Power case is applicable to this situation because as the trial court 
found, Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-516 [previously Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-15] 
requires the recording of condemnation judgments. Because the Utah statute requires the 
recording of condemnation judgments and because the subject condemnation judgment 
was not recorded before it expired within eight years, the condemnation judgment lost its 
effect and the property never vested in the State of Utah. Any other construction or 
interpretation would allow this state to be negligent in recording its property rights. The 
purpose of the recording statutes is to keep accurate and detailed records and any 
unreasonable exceptions for the state should not be supported. 
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find a factual situation similar to the one now before the court. Unfortunately, counsel 
has been unable to locate any other case law, statutory interpretation, or other assistance 
from other jurisdictions that would be persuasive authority except as set forth above. 
Therefore, this appears to be a matter very unique to Utah law, and Appellant asserts that 
the trial court interpreted the issue and the statute erroneously and came to the wrong 
conclusion. The State of Utah should not be able to enjoy any rights to the subject 
property because it failed to record the Judgment within eight years. Ed Higley thereafter 
took possession of the property, used the property, and paid taxes thereon for the entire 
intervening period. 
Another statute is also helpful. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-2-201 precludes 
actions by the State. 
The state may not bring an action against any person for or with respect to 
any real property, its issues or profits, based upon the state's right or title to 
the real property, unless: 
(3) the right or title to the property accrued within seven years before any 
action or other proceeding is commenced: or 
(4) the state or those from whom it claims received all or a portion of the 
rents and profits from the real property within the immediately preceding 
seven years. 
This statute precludes the State from bringing an action unless its right or title to property 
accrued within seven years. The State of Utah clearly does not have any claims to the 
property within seven years prior to recording of the Judgment and any of its rights are 
based upon a 1974 judgment which do not give the state the right to take title to the 
property. Edwin Higley and his successors have used the property frequently for 
recreational and other purposes and paid taxes thereon for all the time that the State itself 
did not use the property. Based thereon, the State of Utah lost its rights to the property. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ADVERSE 
POSSESSION CANNOT BE OBTAINED AGAINST THE STATE OF 
UTAH IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Because the subject property was not used by the State for a public purpose, 
Appellant should prevail on its adverse possession claim. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-2-
216 discusses adverse possession of public streets or ways. This statute provides as 
follows: 
A person may not acquire by adverse possession any right in or title to any 
property held by a town, city, or county and designated for public use as 
streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or any other public 
purpose, unless the town, city, or county has sold, or otherwise disposed of, 
and conveyed the property to a purchaser for valuable consideration, and 
more than seven \ears subsequent to that conveyance the purchaser or the 
purchaser's grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, 
continuous, and ad\erse possession of the real estate. 
This statute does not discuss adverse possession against the State. Because the statute 
does not discuss adverse possession against the State, adverse possession must 
necessarily be available against the State of Utah at least in certain circumstances. The 
circumstances of the situation at hand are prime for allowing adverse possession against 
the State of Utah. The State of Utah should not be able to allow a judgment to lapse over 
a 29 year period, not record the judgment in a timely fashion and then still have title to 
property. At some point the State needs to be accountable for its actions and accept the 
consequences for its failure to protect its property rights. Ed Higley paid the taxes on this 
property and used the property for approximately twenty nine years. Therefore. Ed 
Higley should be able to obtain title to the property. Ed Higley had no idea that the State 
did not honor his asserted ownership. In fact, he developed a portion of the property 
supposedly under the condemnation order into lots and sold them to various parties. The 
State of Utah should not be able to sit back over such a long period of time in these 
circumstances and obtain ownership. The State of Utah lost its title when it failed to 
record and further lost its title by allowing Ed Higley to pay taxes on the property and to 
take control over the same. 
'There is a legal distinction between property impressed with a public purpose and 
property of an agency not so impressed, for in the later instance the property may be sold 
for delinquent special assessments levied by other agencies or may be effected by adverse 
possession and other burdens of private property/' See, Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 166 P.2d 917 (Cal. App. 1946). In other words, this court 
should not look at who owned the property but the use which has been made of the 
property. The better rule is that private uses are subject to adverse possession while 
public uses are not subject to adverse possession. In fact, this appears to be the rule in 
Utah. See. Pioneer Investment and Trust Company v. Board of Education of Salt Lake 
City, 99 P. 150 (Utah 1909) "According to Utah law, a public corporation may hold 
property in 'he nature of a private, as well as in a governmental, capacity, is a well 
recogmzeil 'J/jcirme aiiu iiaii OJCII auopicu o\ mis couri. j_u. ai IDJ cuing wgucn L.ii/> \. 
Waterworks Co., 28 Utah, 42, 76 P. 1069; Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah, 222, 93 P. 
570 (Utah 1908) abrogated on other grounds by Kessler v. Mortensen, 16 P.3d 1225 
(Utah 2000). "To property so held [in private] the exception does not apply." Pioneer 
Investment at 153. Thus, when the state holds property for private use said property 
should not be protected from adverse possession. 
The dissenting opinion in Provo City v. Jacobsen, 176 P.2d 130 (Utah 1947) 
addressed the issue of whether or not land owned by the state in a governmental capacity 
can be adversely possessed and suggested that adverse possession against the State is 
unavailable. The majority opinion did not address the issue. However, the dissenting 
opinion does not necessarily control the outcome of this case. Moreover, the scope of the 
protection of the sovereign under this rule is a question. The State will certainly argue 
that no lands held by the State can be adversely possessed. However, the rule should be 
more conservative^ construed. The rule should be that state-owned land which is 
privately used can be adversely possessed. 
Ihe land in question has never been used by the State lor a public purpose. Ihe 
public has no use for this land and/or the public has not been given access to this land. 
Even today there is a sign on the property which states, "Private Property-Utah 
Department of Transportation-No Trespassing". The more narrowly tailored rule set 
forth b\ the California appellate court which states that, "where public lands have been 
devoted to public use they cannot obtain title thereto by prescription/' See, Big Rock 
Mutual Water Company v. Vahermo Ranch Company 248 P.264. 267 (Cal. App. 1926). 
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protected from adverse possession, any property held by the State that is not open for 
public use should be treated differently and adverse possession should apply especially in 
circumstances such as this. Thus, the rule which this court should impose is that title to 
land held by the State for a "public use" cannot be acquired b> adverse possession. This 
necessarily means that title to land held by the State for a nonpublic use can be acquired 
by adverse possession. The trial court should make a finding to determine the purpose 
for which the subject property is held by the State and it will be determined that the State 
does not hold the property for a public use and is not held for the public benefit and 
therefore it can be acquired by adverse possession. 
Appellant acknowledges that there is case law from other jurisdictions suggesting 
that adverse possession against the sovereignty or the State is often not allowed under the 
common law. However, in these circumstances, if such a rule were adopted, the court 
should carve out an exception for an equitable exception given the length of time which 
has passed and the circumstances of this case. 
III. IF THE COURT FINDS AGAINST APPELLANT ON THE PREVIOUS 
TWO ISSUES, APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE 
REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE STATE OF UTAH FOR ALL 
PROPERTY TAXES PAID TO WEBER COUNTY. 
Appellant sought for the trial court to exercise its equitable remedies to require the 
State of Utah to reimburse Appellant for all the property taxes that it had paid on the 
property from 1974 through 2004. The trial court rejected the requested relief pursuant to 
its minute entry dated February 4, 2009. R.520. Appellant's argument is that but for the 
conduct of the State of Utah in failing to record its judgment in a timely manner. Edwin 
Higley would not have received tax statements from Weber County and would not have 
paid the taxes to Weber County. Edwin Higley and/or his estate paid the taxes for a 
period of almost thirty years prior to the State of Utah recording its judgment. If the State 
of Utah is entitled to the property, then the State of Utah should be required to reimburse 
Edwin Higley and his estate for all of the property taxes which he equitably should not 
have paid but for the State of Utah's conduct. Appellant set forth several theories to the 
trial court's such as unjust enrichment, laches, equitable recoupment, etc. The trial court 
rejected these theories and stated that the Estate of Edwin Higley could not recover on 
such claims as against the State of Utah. 
The appellate court should reconsider this ruling and should allow for the Estate of 
Edwin Higley to receive compensation for the taxes paid from the State. It is clear that 
the State of Utah made a significant mistake. Had the State recorded its judgment 
properly and within the proper timeframe, Weber County would not have imposed upon 
Edwin Higley the duty to pay property taxes. Edwin Higley simply paid the property 
taxes that the County imposed upon him resulting from the State's failure to protect its 
property interests. 
Courts are accorded considerable latitude and discretion in applying and 
formulating an equitable remedy. See, Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 
1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); LHIW, Inc. \ . DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961. 963 (Utah 1988): 
Morris v. Sykes, 624 P. 2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981). Under Utah law, court's have broad 
authority to grant equitable relief as needed. See. Concrete Products Company v. Salt 
"Utah courts have broad authority to grant equitable relief as needed." See, Utah Coal 
and Lumber Rest. Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited. 40 P.3d 581. 583 (Utah 2001); 
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1243 (Utah 1998). Courts should invoke this authority 
whenever appropriate and necessary to enforce rights or to prevent oppression and 
injustice. See, Williamson v. Wanless, 545 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1976). Equitable 
remedies are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See, Collard v. Nagle 
Construction Constr., Inc., 149 P.3d 348 (Utah 2006). Upon being directed to do so, the 
district court has unique ability to balance facts and craft equitable remedies. See, 
Parduhn v. Bennett 112 P.3d 495, 502 (Utah 2005). 
With the court's equitable discretion as background, this Court should review the 
relevant facts in this case with a view towards accomplishing equity as it relates to 
balancing the parties' competing interests. It is undisputed that the 1974 condemnation 
order was not recorded in Weber County back in 1974. R. 108. It is also undisputed that 
the subject condemnation order was not recorded until January 2003. R. 108. The State 
of Utah has not yet come forward and explained to the court why it failed to record this 
document. Appellant believes that the State did not actively protect its rights. The 
State's failure to record the operative document has given rise to the current situation. As 
a result of the State's failure to record the condemnation order, Weber County began 
collecting taxes from Edwin Higley. Edwin Higley paid those taxes and has used and 
occupied the subject property for many years. For whatever reason, the State waited until 
after Edwin Higley passed away in order to record the condemnation order. Appellant is 
at a sitznincant disadvantage as a .result, fhe State's delay in recording the document 
should not be a fact which the State can use to its benefit. 
The State's conduct in this situation should be weighed equitably and balanced 
with the interest of The Estate of Edwin Higley. Once that balancing test is 
accomplished, the court should conclude that the equities result in a reimbursement by 
the State of Utah of taxes paid by Appellant and its predecessor. Because Appellant and 
its predecessor in interest have paid taxes on the property for a considerable period of 
time, the State should be required to refund those monies together with interest thereon as 
an equitable remedy. Appellant seeks for the court to exercise its equitable powers in this 
matter. 
A variety of equitable theories are relevant. For example, the doctrine of laches 
bars recovery when there has been a delay by one party causing a disadvantage to the 
other party. See, Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugar House Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 
1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). Laches has two elements: (1) lack of diligence on the part of 
the claimant; and (2) an injury to the Appellee because of the lack of diligence. Id. 
Clearly the State's lack of diligence has caused I he Estate of Edwin Higley to be at a 
significant disadvantage. The State's failure to record the condemnation order should not 
be used to the disadvantage of The Estate of Edwin Higley. This means that under the 
equitable doctrine of laches, this court should craft an equitable remedy for the facts and 
circumstances of this situation. The State's delay of nearl\ 30 \ears is unacceptable and 
the State should not be allowed to benefit from that error when it is the State's error 
which has created the problem. 
i_^ ci^ iiCv3 Gciw} ci iCcuvci > wncii Liiv^ ic iicxo cCCn d vaCici> o\ one pali\ caiioim, a 
disadvantage to the other party, requiring the lack of diligence on the part of the claimant 
and an injury to the Appellee because of a lack of diligence. See, Plateau Min. Co. v. 
Utah Div. of the State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990). In another case, 
the court fashioned an equitable remedy in an unjust enrichment situation where the court 
awarded one-half of the benefit received to be the proper measure of damages. See, 
Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997). If the State had recorded its 
interest within a short period of time, then equity would not need to intervene. However, 
the passage of 29 years of time and after the applicable party has already passed away, it 
is improper for the State to engage in this type of activity. 
Equitable estoppel is a theory which allows a court to use its equitable powers to 
modify existing rights. For example, equitable estoppel allows a court to modify a 
contract or prevent a party from denying the validity of a contract when one party has 
relied on another party's conduct. See, Swan Creek Village Homeowners v. Warne. 134 
P.3d 1 122 (Utah 2006). The availability of equitable relief helps to ensure that justice is 
met and prevents parties from avoiding valid obligations. Id. Equitable estoppel is also 
available when a complaining party makes a statement, admission, act, or failure to act 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted. See, Bingham Consol Co. v. Groesveck, 105 
P.3d 365 (Utah App. 2004). In other words, in this case, the State of Utah failed to 
record its interest in the subject propert) in a timeh manner and now expects to recover 
the full property. If the State is to successfully reclaim the subject property, this is an 
appropriate situation for applicable of the equitable estoppel doctrine. 
in jisici ioi cqUiLciDic estoppel lo appi\« liiicc ^i^in^nl^ mu^i u^ pic^ciu. \^i) a 
representation, act. or omission; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change of position to 
one's detriment based on that reliance. See, Rothey v. Walker Bank and Trust Company. 
754 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 1988). In this situation, the State of Utah omitted to record 
the condemnation order and failed to do so for a period of at least 29 years. This clearly 
satisfies the element of an omission in the equitable estoppel cause of action. It is not 
equitable for this court to ignore the State's dilatory conduct which caused this issue. 
The State wants to make a mistake and cause others to rely upon that mistake and then 
wait around 29 years to be totally discharged of that mistake. Such conduct and outcome 
is inappropriate and inequitable. 
The second element of the equitable estoppel argument is that of justifiable 
reliance. Edwin Higley justifiably relied on his use of the property and his payment of 
the taxes thereon for a long period of time. Based thereon he clearly believed that he 
owned the subject property. He even successfully developed and sold property adjacent 
to the subject property. R. 120. Had the State manifested its intention to take ownership 
of the property it would have recorded the condemnation order before the judgment 
expired. To totally let the State off the hook for this mistake and allow the State to come 
back and reclaim the property 29 years after the fact is completely inequitable. 
Obviously the State has not needed that property for more than three decades. 
A third element of the equitable estoppel claim is changing of one's position to 
his detriment based upon that reliance. Clearly, Edwin Higley changed his position when 
he started receiving tax notices from Weber County relating to this property. Edwin 
iiigiC\ Ciidngeu ills pOoiiion anc*. ocgan paying taxc^ on liic properly wincii is a direct 
result of the State's failure to record. 
Appellant's claim for "money had and received'' is a valid cause of action as a 
result of this situation. The State of Utah is clearly to blame for Appellant's incurring of 
the taxes on the subject property. Had the State of Utah properly recorded the 
condemnation order. Edwin Higley would not have been asked to pay taxes thereon. In 
the Supreme Court case of CIG Exploration v. State of Utah, 24 P.3d 966 (Utah 2001) the 
Utah courts make it clear that the cause of action of "money had and received" is a valid 
cause of action in the State of Utah. Appellant requests that the court invoke its equitable 
powers to require reimbursement by the State to Appellants all of the taxes which have 
been paid plus interest as a result of the wrongful conduct of the State of Utah. Equitable 
recoupment is another theory available to Appellant. Under general equitable principles, 
the Estate of Edwin Higley should be allowed to recoup the property itself or to recoup 
the taxes it paid resulting from the State's errors. 
Constructive trust is a matter of equity where there has been a wrongful act. unjust 
enrichment and specific property that can be traced to the wrongful behavior. With 
regard to constructive trust, the Supreme Court case of Wilcox v. Anchor Wate, 164 P.3d 
353 (Utah 2007) also shows that constructive trust is a valid cause of action. Courts 
recognize a constructive trust as a matter of equity when there has been: (1) a wrongful 
action; (2) unjust enrichment; and (3) specific property that can be traced to the wrongful 
behavior. Id. at 362. Clearly, Appellant meets this cause of action because the wrongful 
act is the State's omission of recording its own condemnation order and the State now is 
beimi unuistN enriched by aiiempimg VJ lake me properly oack in lull, mere is op^cinc 
property which can be traced to that wrongful behavior which is the subject property to 
this action. Therefore, Appellant meets all of the elements of this cause of action and this 
cause of action should be allowed to proceed. 
The trial court granted dismissal of Appellant's equitable claims even before 
hearing all of the evidence relating thereto. R.520. Dismissal should not be granted on 
the facts before the court in the pleadings. In other words, the court should not dismiss a 
case prematurely. As a general proposition "[a] dismissal is a severe measure. . . ." 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). The "court must accept 
the material allegations of the complaint as true, . . ." Id. at 624. "[T]he courts are a 
forum for settling controversies, and if there is any doubt whether a claim should be 
dismissed, . . . the issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to 
present its proof" Id. at 624. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgments in Utah are effective for only eight years and the attempt by the State 
of Utah to record its condemnation judgment 21 years after it had expired is ineffective. 
Because of the failure to timely record the subject property never vested in the State of 
Utah. Although adverse possession against a sovereign for property held for the public 
use is not allowed, the subject property was not held by the State of Utah for public use 
and was held for private use, if any. Therefore, adverse possession should be allowed 
against the State of Utah for property not held for the public use in these circumstances. 
In the event that the court disagrees with Appellant on the above two issues, then the 
Estate of Edwin Higley should be entitled to reimbursement from the State of Utah for all 
property taxes paid to Weber County during the intervening period plus interest. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ i S day of September, 2009. 
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C. 
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I N THE SECOND DISTRICT COGRT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE Or LfTAH 
j 
'-STATE v&OAD COMMISSION, 
10^ Plaint iff , 
* M. HXGLEY and AFTQN C 
ZY, h i s w i f e ; KERMIT 
IALL and NAYON BRIMHALL, 
</i f e , 
Defendants 
(^T3 ier 
FINAL ORDER OF CONDEMNATION 
C i v i l No. 16491 _ 
P r o j e c t No- I - 8 0 N - 6 { 7 ) 4 6 
P a r c e l Noa. 49:A, 49-.E, 4 9 : 2 E , 
4 9 : 3 5 , 4 9 : 4 E , 49;5E and 4 9 ; $ 
T o t a l Payment ; £ 6 8 , 9 2 8 , 0 4 
r t a p p e a r i n g t o t h e c o u r t and t h e c o u r t now f i n d s t h a t 
t a f o r e , on t he 4 th day o f J a n u a r y . L974, Chis c o u r t made 
e n t e r e d i t s judgment in t h e above e n t i t l e d p r o c e e d i n g , 
s a i d j u d g m e n t i s h e r e b y r e f e r r e d t o ; and 
I t a p p e a r i n g t o t h e c o u r t and t h a c o u r t now f i n d s t h a t 
u a n t t o t h e law and t h e s a i d j u d g m e n t , t h e p l a i n t i f f d i d 
s a i d j u d g m e n t to t h e d e f e n d a n t s Edwin M- H l g l e y and Af ton 
f i g l e y , h i s w i f e , Kermr t B r imha iL nnd wayon B r i m h a i l , h i s 
t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e d by s a i d judgment t o 
> a i d ; and 
I t f u r t h e r a p p e a r i n g t o t h e c o u r t t h a t t h a p l a i n t i f f 
_made a_l I payments as r e q u i r e d by law and o r d e r of t h i s c o u r t , 
c i ^ c r Lh i-i -'. •"> nor s\ cas*> wh^rR any bond was r e q u i r e d co be 
i n , and a l l and s i n g u l a r t h e law in t h e p r e m i s e s b e ; n g g i v e n 
: h e c o u r t u n d e r s t o o d and f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d , 
IT IS "THEREFORE ORDERED, AQJUDGE0 AND DECREED t h a t t h e 
: e l 3 o f l a n d h e r e i n a f t e r d e s c r i b e d a r e h e r e b y t a k e n and- c a n -
l e d in f e e s i m p l e t i t l e a s Co P a r c e l Nos . 49 ;A, 49:S and f a r 
an ien t r i g h t s as t o P a r c e l Nos . 4 9 ; £ , 4 9 ; 2 E , 4 9 : 3 E , 49 ;4E and 
5E, f o r t h e p u r p o s e d e s c r i b e d and s e t f o r t h i n t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s 
p l a i n t , i . e . , f o r t h e u s e o f t h e p l a i n t i f f , t h e S t a t e o f U t a h , 
E* 19054 12 BK2308 P61<$3« 
u • .hu.v nu rnn^^ ° 0 1 ^ CROFTS* VEBCR CQttHTY RECORPER 
h ighway purposes. U-JAH-03 <42 Pfl HZ 1.00 OEP JPfl 
££C FOR.* UrAH,0EPT,«OF,rRAHSPOftfATI0H 0108 
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XT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that sa id 
a p u b l i c use and a use authorized by Law. 
IT IS FURTBER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED tha t a 
f t h i s finaL order of condemnation be f i l ed With the county 
e r of Davis County, S ta te of Utah, and thereupon the 
ty i n t e r e s t s he re ina f t e r referred to and se t for th 
v e s t i n fee simple t i tLe as to Parce l Nos, 49:A, 49:S 
>r easement r i g h t s as to Parcel tfos. 49;E, 49:2E, 4§;3E, 49:4E 
):5E, in the p l a i n t i f f . The following i s a desc r ip t ion of 
Dropecty 3a ordered and condemned as hereinabove provided, 
i s hereby veatad in fee simple t i t l e as to Parcel No. 49;A, 
and for easement nights as Lu Parcel oJos *9:E, 49 IE 19 3E 
and 49 : SP KI the p l a in t i f f , al l of such property baing 
t ed in David County, Sta te of Utah and is mare p a r t i c u l a r l y 
ibed ae fa l lows; 
q Mo. BQN-6:49:A 
A p a r c e l of land in fee for a freeway known as Project 
iON"-6, being pa r t of an en t i re t r a c t of proper ty , in the NEVSW^  
ac t ion 27, T 5 M. , R. I W. , S,L.B.&M. The boundaries of said 
?L of land are described as follows; 
Beginning on the eas te r ly l ine of the SW^ of said 
ion 27 a t a point 90.0 f t . r ad ia l ly d i s t a n t souther ly from 
c e n t e r l i n e of the eastbound lane of sa id p ro j ec t , which 
c i s approximately 1491 f t . nor ther ly from the SE- corner at 
,S\ihi thence^Norther ly 364 f t .? mare or l eas , along said 
e r i y l i n e to a paint" 120fD~ftC. ~ra~dlafly d is tan t—nor t^s- t -a r ly 
Ltie ceuLLi. „*.-- "-" s t^^ *-bound lane of said project, thence 
hwesterly 5 16 f t . , mora or less, along the arc at a bpiial Lu 
lef t which is concentric with and 120,0 ft. radially distant 
hwesterly from an 800.0-foot ten-chord spiral far a 1°00' 
Q to a point opposite Engineer Station 232+QQ (Note; Tangent 
iaid spi ra l at i t s point of beginning bears approximately 
I 7°26' W.}; thence S. 75a49' W. 200.23 ft . to a point 90.0 ft. 
.ally dis tant northwesterly from the center line of said west-
id lane opposite Engineer Station 230+02.50; thence Southwesterly 
f t . / mare or less, along the arc of a spiral to the right which 
:oncentric wtth and 90.0 ft. radially distant northwesterly from 
200.0-foot ten-chord spiral for a 2°00' curve to a westerly bound-
line of saLd entire tract (Note: Tangent to last said spiral 
_2_ 
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Ls p o L n t o f b e g i n n i n g b e a r s S. 8 4 a 2 1 * W.)? t h e n c e S o u t h e r l y 
f t . , ma re o r Less , aLang s a i d w e s t e r l y b o u n d a r y l i n e t a a 
hwesfcerLy b o u n d a r y Line of s a i d e n t i r e t r a c t ; t h e n c e S- 85 aQQi £ , 
3 f t . ; t h e n c e N. 88 q53« E- 77 .93 f t . ; t h e n c e tJ. 8 8 * 4 5 ' E-
76 r t . ; t h e n c e tf. 89°56 < E. 4 9 9 . 8 3 f t . t o a p o i n t 9 0 . 0 f t . 
a l l y d i s t a n t s o u t h e r l y from t h e c e n t e r l i n e o f s a i d e a s t b a u n d 
a p p o s i t e E n g i n e e r S t a t i o n 232+00; t h e n c e E a s t e r l y 5 LI f t . , 
o r l e s s , a l o n g t h e a r c o f a s p i r a l t o t h e r i g h t w h i c h i s 
e n f c r i c w i t h and 9 0 . 0 f t . r a d i a l l y d i s t a n t s o u t h e r l y from an 
0 - f o o t : t e n - c h o r d s p i r a l f o r a Qa30< c u r v e , (Mate . T a n g e n t 
a s t s a i d s p i r a l a t i t s p a i n t o f b e g i n n i n g b e a r s fcf^88a56' E . ) 
h e p o i n t o f b e g i n n i n g . The above d e s c r i b e d p a r c e l o f l a n d 
a m s 9 . 0 1 a c r e s , more o r l e s s . 
T o g e t h e r w i t h any and a l l a b u t t e r s r i g h t s o f u n d e r l y i n g 
t o t h e c e n t e r of e x i s t i n g r i g h t s af way a p p u r t e n a n t t o t h i s 
rey a n c e . 
( N o t e ; GL0 Su rvey B e a r i n g of t h e s o u t h l i n e of s a r d 
n a n 27 i s r o t a t e d Q ° 1 5 ' 1 9 ( ' c l o c k w i a e t o match Highway Su rvey 
- i n g s A l l b e a r i n g s and d i s t a n c e s m thes above d e s c r i p t i o n 
b a s e d un th«» IfLah , ' i t 1 PI m e C o o r d i n a t e Sys tem ) 
T o g e t h e r WLth any and a l l r i g h t s o r e a s e m e n t s a p p u r t e n -
bo t h e r e m a i n i n g p o r t i o n of ^ a l d e n t i r e t r a c t of p r o p e r t y by 
gon a f t h e l o c a t i o n t h e r e o f w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o s a r d f r e e w a y , 
L u d l n g , w i t h o u t l i m i t i n g t h e f o r e g o i n g , a l l r i g h t s of i n g r e s s 
j r e g r e s s from s a i d r e m a i n i n g p o r t i o n , c o n t i g u o u s t o t h e 
ds h e r e b y c o n v e y e d , t o o r frocn s a i d f r e e w a y . 
g e l H o . B0f l -6 .49 :E 
An e a s e m e n t upon p a r t a f an e n t i r e t r a c t o f p r o p e r t y 
t h e tfE%SU*f o f S e c t i o n 27 , T, 5 tf. , R. 1 W., S .L .B .&M, . i n 
i s C o u n t y , U t a h , f o r t h e p u r p o s e of c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r e o n a 
s l o p e and a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t s t h e r e o f i n c i d e n t t o t h e cond-
u c t i o n of a f reeway known as p r o j e c t bTo. 80N-6 , 
S a i d p a r t o f an e n t i r e t r a c t i s d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s : 
B e g i n n i n g on t h e e a s t e r l y l i n e a f t h e SW*y a f s a i d S e c t i o n 
a t _ a . p o i n t _ l 15 ._0 _ft^. j r a d i a l l y d i s t a n t s o u t h e r l y from t h e c e n t e r 
in o f t h e e a s t b a u n d lanfl a T l ^ i c T pea J ec tT7~v/h:ich p a i n t ' i s - a p p r a x i 
e l y 1471 t t . r o n n d n y i.i.^.» ^..- _ ^ -< r i a a i d SWJy • t h e n c e 
, - t e r l y 510 f t . , more o r l e s s , a l o n g t h e a r c of a s p i r a l to t h e 
: t w h i c h i s c o n c e n t r i c w i t h and 115-0 f t . r a d i a l l y d i s t a n t 
i t h e r l y f rom a i 6 0 0 . 0 - f o o t - a n - c h o r d s p i r a l f o r a Q53Q" c u r v e 
a o o i n t oCwOiiLa Zr.~L~e<zc J t a r i o n 2 3 2 - 0 0 'Kcto.- T a n g s n t t o 
id s p i r a l a t i t s p a i n t of b e g i n n i n g b e a r s >?. 8 5 ^ 2 8 ' W.J ; : h e n c e 
L a 0 4 ' E. 4 6 . 7 3 f t . ; t h e n c e S. aS^Qa' E. 342 ,75 f t . ; t h e n c e 
8 5 ° 0 6 ' E. 168 f t . , more o r l e s s , to t h e e a s t e r l y l i n e of s a i d 
i; t h e n c e N o r t h e r l y 65 f t , , more o r l e s s , a l o n g s a i d e a s t e r l y 
i e to" t h e p a i n t of b e g i n n i n g c o n t a i n i n g 0 .75 a c r e , more o r 
{ N o t e : GLO S u r v e y B e a r i n g a f t h e s a u t h l i n e of s a i d 
r t i o n 2 7 i s r o t a t e d 0 ° 1 5 ' 1 9 " c l o c k w i s e t o ma tch Highway Survey 
Ei 1 9 0 5 4 1 2 BK230B P S 1 6 ^ 0 
- 3 -
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- n g s . ALL b e a r i n g s and d i s t a n c e s m t h e a b o v e d e s c r i p -
a r e b a s e d on t h e tit ah S t a t e ?Laae C o o r d i n a t e S y s t e m . ) 
ll tfo* 80bT-6:49:2C 
An e a s e m e n t upon p a r t of an e n t i r e t r a c t o f p r o p e r t y 
i e tJE^SW^ o f S e c t i o n 27 , T . 5 N. , R_ L W_, S .L .8 .&M- , m 
3 C o u n t y , U tah , f a r t h e p u r p o s e a f c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r e o n an 
g a t i o n and u t i L i t y f a c i l i t y and a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t s t h e r e o f 
3 e n t t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a f r eeway known as P r o j e c t No. 8QN-6. 
p a r t o f an e n t i r e t r a c t i s d e s c r i b e d as f o i i o w s : 
B e g i n n i n g a t a p o i n t 9 0 . 0 f t . r a d i a l l y d i s t a n t s o u t h e r L y 
t h e c e n t e r Line o f t h e e a s t b o u n d Lane of s a i d p r o j e c t o p p o s i t e 
l e e r S t a t i o n 232-tOO, wh ich p a i n t i s a p p r o x i m a t e L y 510 f t . 
*rLy a L o n g t h e s o u t h e r L y Line o f s a i d NE%SW^ and L77 f t . 
i e r L y aLong a s t r a i g h t Line from t h e SE- c o r n e r o f s a i d NE^SW1?; 
: a S. S 9 q 5 6 ' w. 4 9 9 . 8 3 f t . ; t h e n c e S. 8 8 * 4 5 ' W. L89.7G f t . ; 
_e S , 8 8 * 5 3 ' w. 7 7 . 9 3 f t . ; t h e n c e S. 85*0Q' E. 2 8 6 . 4 3 f t , ; 
2Q N. 8 9 ° 5 6 ' E. 4S2 .62 f t . ; t h e n c e N . l ° 0 4 ' W. 20.0 f t . t o t h e 
i o f b e g i n n i n g , c o n t a i n i n g 0 . 4 3 a c r e , mare o r L e s s . 
( N o t e . ^LO Sur- 'ey B e a r i n g oL f, » •* - j t r ! l i a i it ^ a { d 
LOII 27 i s r o t a t e d Q^LS1 19" c l o c k w i s e t o d ia tch Highway Survey 
m g s . ALL b e a r i n g s and d i s t a n c e s i n t h e above d e s c r i p t i o n 
3 a a a d a n t h e Utah S t a t e P lane GooLdina tw S y s t e m . ) 
A f t e r i r r i g a t i o n and u t i l i t y f a c i L i t y 13 c o n s t r u c t e d on 
a b o v e d e s c r i b e d pa r r , o f an e n t i r e t r a c t a t t h e e x p a n s e of s a i d 
2 Road Coramiaa ian , s a i d S t a t e Road Commiss ion i s t h e r e a f t e r 
i v e d a f any f u r t h e r c l a i m oc demand f o r c a s t s , damages o r 
t a n a n c e c h a r g e s w h i c h may a c c r u e a g a i n s t s a i d i r r i g a t i o n and 
i t y f a c i l i t y and a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t s t h e r e o f , 
5 I NO. 80N-6;49» 3E 
An e a s e m e n t upon p a r t of an e n t i r e t r a c t a f p r o p e r t y 
-je NE^SW^ of S e c t i o n 27 , T. 5 N. , R. L W., S.L.B.ficM,, i n Davis 
by , U t a h , f a r t h e p u r p o s e of c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r e o n an i r n g a -
f a c i L i t y and a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t s t h e r e o f i n c i d e n t t o t h e c a n -
: t i o n o f a f r eeway known as P r o j e c t No. 8 0 N - 6 , 
S a i d p a c t "of an e n t i r e t r a c t i s d e s o r i b e d as -Col Lows • 
GecLn i inQ on t h e e .as te . r l \ l i c e of : h e SWh o r s a i d 
i o n 2 ^ a-c 3 p o L i c 9Q.0 f t . r a d i a l 1 •;, c i s t a - i s o o t h e r " . / : : c ~ 
-<tot<£r I i>-v c^5 z.tbn c-isc-boiiQC . i ^ t zi s i i i p-irc;: <: <r t , '-r<.zzz. pcizr-
:>CTrc-*i-"^c<a »^ 14"=- ^ _ racrtz-cr1
 : : c^rr ; ^ - i"_. x : : e : v^ i ^ . i 
r : ,e- iCe i c s : ^ r»y 311 f t . , c^>r<^ ~*r , e-fs. -»'. ,"•; ---.* s,~: : : a 
S L ~o ; ; c - j f z v.- . icr i s r 3 * ? : ? " z : : c - i u ~ ; . i ] ?d. 1 m i. r j c . - . . ^ 
a n t scvicr .-arly :rc-c: =3 S C C . l - f c o : : « , - : - ; . - : r d s p i r a l : c : a 
' c u r . e t o a p e i n e ^ppo^-ice L",- : ir , icr 5 ; c : i a n 222 -0Q Ucz2. 
a n t " to s a i c s p i r a l ac i t s Z&I-.Z sf c e : i . ^ i n : b e a r s a ? p r o x i ^ 
Lv N, 8 9 ' 2 6 ' v / . } ; t h e n c a S- ,1 34 ' £. 2 5 . 0 f t t o a p o i n t 
3 f t . r a d i a L L y d i s t a n t s e i n e r L1 from t h e c e n t e r l i n e of s a i d 
o a u n d Lane o p p o s i t e E n g i n e e r S t a t i o n 2 3 2 ^ 0 0 ; t h e n c e E a s t e r L y 
f t . , m a r e o r L e s s , aLang che a r c of a s p i r a L t o t he r i g h t which 
0111 
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r o n c e n t r i c w i t h and LL5.0 f t . r a d i a l l y d i s t a n t s o u t h e r l y 
a a n 9 Q G . 0 - f o o t t e n - c h o r d s p i r a l f o r a 0 q 3 0 ' c u r v e t o s a i d 
i s r l y l i n e of s a i d SW*j ( N o t e : T a n g e n t to l a s t s a i d s p i r a l 
I t s p o i n t o f b e g i n n i n g b e a r s S. 8 8 ° 5 6 ' E« ) ; t h e n c e tfortheriy 
.0 f t , , m o r e a r l a s s , a l o n g s a i d e a s t e r l y l i n e t a t h e p a i n t 
b e g i n n i n g , c o n t a i n i n g 0 . 2 9 a c r e , more o r less. 
( N o t e ; GCO S u r v e y B e a r i n g of t h e s o u t h l i n e of s a i d 
t i o n 27 i s r o t a t e d Qa 15 ' 19" c l o c k w i s e t o match Highway S u r v e y 
r i n g s . A l l b e a r i n g s and d i s t a n c e s i n t h ^ above d e s c r i p t i o n 
b a s e d on t h e Utah S t a t e P l a n a C o o r d i n a t e Sys t em- ) 
A f t e r s a i d i r r i g a t i o n f a c i l i t y i s c o n s t r u c t e d on t h e 
/ e d e s c r i b e d p a r t of an e n t i r e t r a c t a t tha e x p e n s e of s a i d 
t e Road C o m m i s s i o n , s a i d S t a t e Road Commission i s t h e r e a f t e r 
i e v e d o f any f u r t h e r c l a i m o r demand f o r c a s t s , damages o r 
n t e n a n c e c h a r g e s wh ich may a c c r u e a g a i n s t s a i d i r r i g a t i o n 
i l i t y and a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t s t h e r e o f . 
:Q! . NO , 8QN-6 :49 .- 4E 
An e a s e m e n t upon p a r t o f an e n t i r e t r a c t of p r o p e r t y i n 
NE*jSW% o f S e c t i o n 27, T. S N", , R. L W., S.L.B.&M-, in Davis 
h t y , U t a h , f o r t h e p u r p o s e of c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r a a n an i r r i g a -
r i v o v a r f l o w f a c i l i t y and a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t a t h e r e o f i n c i d e n t t o 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of a f r a a w a y known as P r o j e c t No- 8QN-6- Sa id 
t o f an e n t i r e t r a c t i s d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s : 
B e g i n n i n g a t a p o i n t 112 .29 f t . r a d i a l l y d i s t a n t n o r t h -
y f rom t h e c e n t e r l i n e o f t h e w e s t b o u n d lane of s a i d p r o j e c t 
o s i t e E n g i n e e r S t a t i o n 2314*50, w h i c h . p o i n t i s . a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
f t . n o r t h e r l y a l o n g t h e e a s t e r l y l i n e of s a i d NE^SW^ and 
f t . w e s t e r l y a l o n g a s t r a i g h t Line from t h e SE- c o r n e r of 
d NTE^SW^r t h e n c e N. 5 0 3 1 ' W. 7 7 . 7 1 f t . ; t h e n c e S. 7 3 * 1 1 ' W. 
49 f t . ; t h e n c e S. 5 ° 3 i ' E- 7 6 . ^ 2 f t , ; t h e n c e N- 7 5 a 4 9 ' E. 
29 f t , t o t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g , c o n t a i n i n g 0 . 0 4 a c r e s , more 
L e s s . 
(No ta : GLO S u r v e y B e a r i n g of t h e s o u t h l i n e of s a i d 
t i o n 27 LS r o t a t e d 0 ° L 5 ' 1 9 M c l o c k w i s e t o match Highway Survey 
r i n g s . A l l b e a r i n g s and d i s t a n c e s - i n ' the a b o v e - d e s c r i p t i o n -
^ a j u d or: t h e Utah] s t a t e : P l a n e C o o r d i n a t e Syr, rem.) 
A c c a p o r i r . " worv. ea«e=r.-cnc to f a x r i i i c i t a -ho c ; r ^ ; r ^ c : i c r . 
5 a ; i L m ^ i t i C ' r r f e c i •::;>' •ir.d ^ p ^ rr Crn^nz r a r ^ s " i-: t-r vc-f, b«eirys 
.-. a i ^ r c i l or" Izcd 21 : - . v i c t . ic;--;r.*..-/; v e r i e r ; / ;>.-4 -•< rs;^:-v 
e l i n e of i >. e i b o v e C c s c r : ^ - £ ^ s -2 -«e r. ~ , " ^ ; i ; : : - : 1 . 14 > r r 2 . 
The aoQ\'<* d e s c r i b e d t e m p o r a r y work e a s c r . a n t s h a l l empi re 
n t h e - c o m p l e t i o n o f s a i d c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
A f t e r t h e i r r i g a t i o n overfLow f a c i l i t y i s c o n s t r u c t e d 
t h e a b a v « d e s c r i b e d p a r t o f an e n t i r e t r a c t a t t h e expense 
s a i d S t a t e Road C o m m i s s i o n , s a i d S t a t e Raad Commission is t h e r e -
e r r e l i e v e d o f any f u r t h e r c l a i m o r demand f o r c a s t s , damages 
t t 1 9 0 ^ 4 - 1 2 6 0 3 0 8 PQ164-2 
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m a i n t e n a n c e c h a r g e s w h i c h raay a c c r u e a g a i n s t s a i d i r r i g a t i o n 
a r f l a v / f a c i L i t y and a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t s t h e r e o f . 
t r ce l No, 8QK-G:49:5E 
An e a s e m e n t upon p a r t a f an e n t i c e t r a c t a t p r o p e r t y 
t h e tfE^SVf^ of S e c t i o n 2 7 , r . 5 N. , R. L W. , S.L.B1&M. , i n O a v i s 
u n t y , t r t a h , f o r t h * p u r p o s e of c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r e o n an i r r i g a -
3n o v e r f l o w f a c i l i t y and a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t s t h e r e o f i n c i d e n t t o 
e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a f r eeway Known as P r o j e c t No. 6Qtf-6. 
S a i d p a r t o f an e n t i r e t r a c t i s d e s c r i b e d as~" f o l l o w s ; 
B e g i n n i n g on t h e e a s t e r l y Line of t h e tfE^SW^ of s a i d 
r t i o n 27 a c a p o i n t 120.0 f t . r a d i a l l y d i s t a n t n o r t h e r l y frora 
a c e n t e r L i n e of t h e w e s t b o u n d Lane o f s a i d p r o j e c t ; t h e n c e 
r t h e r l y U S f t . , raore o r L e s s , aLong s a i d e a a t a r L y l i n e t o a 
r t h e r L y L i n e of Oavia C o u n t y which i a t h e c e n t e r of t h e . W e b e r 
( /er ; t h e n c e W e s t e r l y 17 f t . . , more or L e s s , aLong s a i d n o r t h e r l y 
ne o f D a v i s c o u n t y and s a i d c e n t e r of t h e Weber R ive r t o a p o i n t 
i n t e r s e c t i o n w i t h a r a d i a L l i n e e x t e n d i n g n o r t h e r l y from t h e 
n t e r L i n e o f s a i d w ^ s t b o a n d Lane o p p o s i t e E n g i n e e r S t a t i o n 
7-f-0U ; c h e a c e S . 2 ° 3 7 ' E . L 35 f t . , more n c Les^, t::< .i po inr. 
O.O f t , r a d i a L L y d i s t a n t n o r t h e r l y from t h e c e n t e r Line of s a i d 
s t b o u n d Lane o p p o s i t e E n g i n e e r S t a t i o n 237-f-OQ: t h e n c e e a s t e r l y 
f t . , more o r l e s s , a l o n g t h e a r c af a s p i r a l , t o the r i g h t w h i c h 
c o n c e n t r i c w i t h and L20 .0 f t . r a d i a L L y d i s t a n t n o r t h e r l y from 
8 0 0 , 0 - f o o t t e n - c h o r d s p i r a l f o r a 1*00' c u r v e (Note : T a n g e n t 
s a i d s p i r a l a t i t a p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g b e a r s tf- 87 Q 23 ' E.) t o 
e p o i n t o f b e g i n n i n g , c o n t a i n i n g 0 . 0 4 a c r e , more or l e s s , 
kLSO: 
A t e m p o r a r y work e a s e m e n t t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
s a i d i r r i g a t i o n f a c i l i t y and a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t s t h e r e o f , b e i n g 
on a p a r c e l of Land 2 5 , 0 f t . w i d e , a d j o i n i n g w e s t e r l y t h e 
s t e r L y s i d e Line of t h e above d e s c r i b e d e a s e m e n t , c o n t a i n i n g 
08 a c r e , more o r L e s s , 
ThQ above d e s c r i b e d t e m p o r a r y work ea semen t s h a l l e x p i r e 
on t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f s a i d c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
( N o t e : GLO S u r v e y B e a r i n g of t h e S o u t h l i n e of s a i d 
c t i a n 27 i s r o t a t e d ' 0° 15'' 19M clockwise' ,"~ta""nratch~ Hig-hw-^y-survey 
_-_;;•?; ^. ~ ! ! b e a r i n g s and d i s t a n c e ^ In bh^ above d e s c r i p t i o n a r e 
s e d on t h e Utah S t a t e P l a n e C o o r d i n a t e S y s t e m . ) 
A f t e r i r r i g a t i o n o v a r f L o v f a c i l i t y i s c o n s t r u c t e d on 
e a b e v ^ d e s c r i b e d p-ar- of an e n t i r e t r a c e a t t h e s^rpensa o: 
i.d S t a t e Road C C«*E.T: i s s i o n , ^ a i i S ta~e "oac Commiss icn i s c h e r e -
c e c r e l i e v e d of any f u r t h e r c ia i r r . or demand fo r c o s t s , damages 
m a i n t e n a n c e c h a r g e s w h i c h «\z? a c c r u e a g a i n s t saj.d i r r i g a t i o n 
e r f low f a c i l i t y and a p p u r t e n a n t p a r t s t h e r e o f . 
r e e l NO. 3 0 ^ - 6 : 4 9 : 5 
A parcel of Land in fee, being a severed portion of an 
tire tract of property lying in Davis and Weber Counties, being 
H 1 9 0 5 4 1 2 6 K 3 3 0 8 PG164-3 
0113 
3.13 
t h e tfE^SW-1* of S e c t i o n 21
 f ? . z tf. , R. I K . . S .L.H.^M, 
n o r t h o c a f r eeway known a s P r o j e c t No. I>8QN-6 (7) ^ 6 . The 
.zi.es o f s a i d t r a c t ace d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s : 
B e g i n n i n g a t t h e NE. c o r n e r of s a i d fcfE^SW^; t h e n c e S o u t h 
. . a l o n g t h e e a s t b o u n d a r y l i n e a f s a i d NEVSW% t o t h e n o r t h e r l y 
: e s s t i n e of s a i d f r e e w a y ; t h e n c e W e s t e r l y a l o n g s a i d n o - a c c e s s 
: h e f o l l o w i n g t h r e e (3) c o u r s e s i S o u t h w e s t e r l y 516 f t . , more 
,*s. a l o n g t h e a r c a f a s p i r a l t o t h e l e f t w h i c h i s c o n c e n t r i c 
xnd 1 2 0 , 0 f t . r a d i a l l y d i s t a n t n o r t h e r l y from an 6 0 0 . 0 - f o o t 
l o r d s p i r a l f o r a i ° 0 0 ' c u r v e t o a p a i n t o p p o s i t e E n g i n e e r 
3n 232-hQO Wes tbound Lane {Nate : T a n g e n t t o s a i d s p i r a l a t 
:>infc o f b e g i n n i n g b e a r s a p p r o x i m a t e l y S. 8 7 ° 2 6 ' W. ) ; t h e n c e 
' 4 9 ' W. 2 0 0 . 2 3 f t . t o a p o i n t 9 0 . 0 f t . r a d i a l l y d i s t a n t n o r t h -
r l y f rom t h e c e n t e r i i n a a f s a i d w e s t b o u n d l a n e o p p o s i t e 
a e r S t a t i o n 2 3 0 + 0 2 . 5 0 ; t h e n c e S o u t h w e s t e r l y 606 f t . , more 
s s , a l o n g t h e a r c a f a s p i r a l t o t h e r i g h t w h i c h i s c o n c e n t r i c 
and 9 0 . 0 f t . r a d i a l l y d i s t a n t n o r t h w e s t e r l y from a 1 2 0 0 . 0 - f o a t 
h a r d s p i r a l f o r a 2aQQ' c u r v e , t o a w e s t b o u n d a r y l i n e of s a i d 
o f l a n d ( N o t e ; T a n g e n t t o l a s t s a i d s p i r a l a t i t s p o i n t of 
fiiiiij b e a r s S. 0 4 a 2 1 . ' W. ) ; t h e n c e Worth L90 f t . a long s a i d 
b o u n d a r y ix.ne t o t h e Davis and Weber County l i n e ? t h e n c e 
25 f t . t o t h e w e s t l i n e of s a i d ME%SW*j; t h e n c e Worth 723 f t . 
s a i d w e s t l i n e t o t h e NW- e a r n e r af s a i d NE^SW^; t h e n c e E a s t 
f t . , m a r e o r l a s s , a l o n g t h e n o r t h Line of s a i d NE^SWl$ to t h e 
"of b e g i n n i n g . The above d e s c r i b e d t r a c t of l and c o n t a i n s 2 5 . 2 2 
, more o r l e s s . 
7 £<*C J 
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A n n n t l f l 1 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMEN T, S TATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF EDWIN HIGLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant 
JUL 2 2007 
RULING, DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON 
THE PLEADINGS 
Civil No 060902417 
fudge W Bient West 
In this quiet title action, the Deiuidant, the Utah Department oi Iianspoitation (UDOl) 
mo\cd (oi judgment on the pleadings I he Com I giants the motion m pait and denies it in pait 
BACKGROUND 
Because this is a motion foi judgment on the pleadings, the Court lecites the facts as 
stated m the Plaintiffs complaint In 1974 UDO T obtained a judgment condemning a tiact of 
the Plaintiffs pioperty Part of the pioperty was located in Davis county and the other part was 
located in Webei While UDOT recorded the judgment m Davis county, it failed to lecord it in 
Weber Count\ foi appioximateh 10 \eais Du..rm tins cielav Edwin Higley (the ownei of the 
disputed pioperty at the time UDOT condemned it) paid taxes on the propeit}, and he possessed, 
occupied and used it UDOT finally recorded the judgment of condemnation in Weber county on 
Tanuary 16,2003 
This recording prompted Mr Higley's estate to assert that it was the true and equitable 
ownei of the disputed property Based on this factual assertion, the estate stated three causes of 
DECISION - COURT GRANTS THE MOTION IN PART M 
l l l l l l l l l l 0180 
action. These were (aj quiet title - UDOT's failure to record the judgment of condemnation 
within eight years of its entry renders its claim to the property invalid pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-22 (78-12-22)-the statute which states that actions to enforce a judgment must be 
brought within eight years of the judgment's entry; (b) mutual mistake - the parties mistakenly 
included the disputed parcel of land in the judgment of condemnation when they actually 
intended to include a different parcel; and (c) unconstitutional taking - since UDOT has paid for 
the parcel of property which should have been included in the condemnation order, not the one 
that was actually included, its assertion of a claim to the property that was included constitutes a 
taking without just compensation. 
In response, UDOT filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. First; UDOT argued 
that the Plaintiff could not use 78-12-22 in this case, because this statute applies to property that 
is not real-this case deals with real property. Second, UDOT argued that the Plaintiffs 
unconstitutional taking and reformation of a judgment claims depended upon its argument that 
78-12-22 barred UDOT's claim-since that provision did not bar UDOT^s claim, these causes of 
action should be dismissed. Third, UDOT contended that the Plaintiffs unconstitutional taking 
claim must fail, because (a) the Plaintiff admits that the property is currently owned by UDOT, 
and {b) the Hainan aiready received eonipciibduou iui die piujjeit^. Filially, LDOT argued dial 
failure to record a document conveying ownership of property does not invalidate ownership. 
At the hearing held on UDOT's motion, the parties focused on (a) whether 78-12-22 
applied to this case; and (b) whether there was enough information in the complaint to state a 
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cause of action for a mistake in the judgment. The Court took under advisement the issue of 
whether the statute of limitations applied. However, the Court denied UDOT's motion on the 
pleadings for the Plaintiffs unconstitutional taking and mistake in the judgment claims, because 
there was sufficient information presented to show that there could have been a mistake in the 
judgment. Now, after review of the parties' memorandums for this motion, the Court will 
dismiss the Plaintiffs unconstitutional taking claim and part of its quiet title claim, but it will 
allow the Plaintiff to maintain its mistake in the judgment claim and the other part of its quiet 
title claim. 
DISCUSSION 
/. Quiet Title 
In the Plaintiffs quiet title claim, it states that Mr. Higley has possessed, occupied, and 
used the property, and he has paid all taxes assessed against it. (Complaint, Page 2-3, IJIJ 12-13). 
Further, the Plaintiff asserts that a judgment becomes invalid eight years after its entry pursuant 
to 78-12-22. The Plaintiff maintains that UDOT's failure to record the judgment of 
condemnation within eight years rendered its ownership claim void. Therefore, the Plaintiff 
argues, it owns the property, not UDOT, and the Court should quiet title to the property to it. 
traditionally, a party as^ciib uiai a iia^ u^cu, JJU^U^UU. anu utuupiui yiuy^i'iy as w-^ll a^ 
paid taxes on it when the party seeks to claim the property based on adverse possession. 
However, the Plaintiffs focus in the quiet title claim is on UDOT's failure to record within the 
time period established by 78-12-22. Given these allegations, the Court is unclear whether the 
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Plaintiffs quiet title claim is a claim for quieting title based on (a) adverse possession or (b) 
UDOT's failure to record in a timely fashion. The Court will presume that the Plaintiff is 
asserting both claims. The Court will not dismiss the Plaintiffs adverse possession claim, but it 
will dismiss the Plaintiffs claim to quiet title based on UDOT's failure to record within the time 
specified in 78-12-22. 
The Plaintiffs quiet title claim based on UDOT's failure to record within the time 
specified in 78-12-22 does not state a claim for which relief can be granted for three reasons. 
First, traditionally, recording a document and ownership of property have been two different 
legal issues. Recording a document conveying ownership of property is usually not a 
prerequisite tor ownership of thai property. Crowthcr v. Mower, 870 P.2d ST0, S79 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) and see, Utah Code Ann, §57-3-102. If the Court was to apply this traditional legal 
concept, UDOT's recording of its judgment would not be an action that enforced a judgment, 
because the judgment dealt with ownership-not recording. In other words, under the traditional 
rule, ownership would pass to UDOT when the judgment of condemnation was entered, and 
UDOT could chose if and when to record the judgment. The second consequence of applying 
this traditional legal concept would be that a failure to record a document conveying ownership 
would not result in a reversion of the property's ownership to the grantor. 
However, Utah statute has modified this traditional rule by requiring entities who obtain 
property through eminent domain to record the judgment of condemnation before title to the 
property vests in the entity condemning the property. Utah Code Ann. §78-34-15. This section 
does not provide any time limits for recording the judgment of condemnation. Under this 
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or until, a condemning entity records the judgment, it would not obtain title to the property. 
Notwithstanding the fact that title remains in the property owner until the condemning entity 
records its judgment, the condemning entity will own the property once the judgment is recorded. 
The issue implicated by the Plaintiff is whether 78-12-22 imposes a time limit to record a 
judgment of condemnation, because in condemnation actions recording is a prerequisite to 
ownership. The Court concludes that it does not. "An action may be brought within eight years 
upon a judgment or decree of any court. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22. The plain language 
of this statute bars an "action," i.e. the filing of a claim/case. Since recording a judgment of 
condemnation is not filing a claim or case with a court, 7S-I2-22 docs not impose a tunc restraint 
for recording a judgment of condemnation. 
Applying these rules to this case, the only requirement imposed on UDOT was to record 
its judgment of condemnation before it obtained title to the property. UDOT recorded the 
judgment of condemnation in January, 2003. (Complaint, Page 2, |^ 10). Therefore, UDOT 
complied with all statutory requirements within the time limits imposed. 
The second reason, the Plaintiffs quiet title claim does not state a claim for relief is the 
failure to bring an action on a judgment within eight years of its entry as required by 78-12-22 is 
not a cause of action. The Plaintiff has not provided any case or statute which would allow a 
party to gain title to property, because another party failed to record a judgment of condemnation 
within the time specified in 78-12-22. This provision is one that provides a statute of limitations 
for enforcing a judgment. It is a defense to an action-not a cause for an action. 
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Finally, the Plaintiffs quiet title claim must fail, because the time limit contained in 78-
12-22 does not apply in this case. A party who seeks to claim property based on an assertion that 
another party's claim to the same property is invalid, is filing a quiet title cause of action. Quiet 
title actions are not subject to the statute of limitations. Nolan v Hoopiiaina (In Re Hoopiiaina 
Trust). 144 P.3d 1129, 1135-38 (Utah 2006). The fact that UDOT received its title to the 
property by order of a court is the basis for UDOT's claim to ownership. However, that fact does 
not change the nature of this case from one quieting title to one enforcing a judgment for the 
purposes of the statute of limitations. 
Since the Plaintiffs claim to quiet title based on UDOT^s failure to record its judgment 
within the time specified by 7S-12-22 does not state a claim fov which, relief can be granted, the 
Court dismisses this claim. 
//. Mutual Mistake 
The Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief in its claim for reformation of the judgment of 
condemnation due to mutual mistake. The Plaintiffs claim for mutual mistake does not depend 
on its argument that 78-12-22 imposes a time limit in which an entity must record a judgment of 
condemnation. It rests on the assertion that UDOT and the Court inadvertently included a 
description of a parcel of property which was not meant to be condemned instead of including the 
description of a parcel that was supposed to be condemned. A court, acting in equity, can hear a 
claim that there was mistake in the judgment due to a mistake of fact or false assumption 
regardless of the length of time that has passed. Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 
1993) (internal quotation omitted). Here, the Plaintiff has asserted that there was a mistake in the 
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judgment. Therefore, the Court denies UDOT's motion on the pleadings as to this claim. 
III. Unconstitutional Taking 
The Plaintiffs claim for an unconstitutional taking without just compensation depends on 
its claim that there was a mistake in the judgment. The Plaintiff asserts that the judgment of 
condemnation included a description of one parcel (included parcel) when the parties intended 
the inclusion of different parcel (intended parcel). The Plaintiff argues that UDOT's payment 
under the judgment of condemnation was actually a payment for the intended parcel-not the one 
that was actually included. Therefore, the Plaintiff contends that UDOT's assertion of an 
ownership claim in the included parcel is taking property without just compensation. 
The Plaintiffs unconstitutional taking claim is unusual, because traditional 
unconstitutional taking claims occur when an entity appropriates property from an owner for 
public use without paying the owner just compensation for the property. The Plaintiff has not-
provided any case where the court found that a unconstitutional taking claim was warranted 
based on the parties' disagreement about which of two parcels should have been appropriated. 
The assertion of this claim in this case is odd, because if the description in the judgment of 
condemnation is correct, then UDOT would be asserting a claim in property which it owns after 
having paid compensation for it-two elements that, if proven, would result in the defeat of a 
unconstitutional taking claim.1 If the description in the judgment is incorrect, the only remedy 
'The Utah Constitution states "private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation." art. 1, § 22. According to the plain language of this provision, 
the elements of an unconstitutional taking are (a) the private property; (b) of the Plaintiff; (c) is 
taken or damaged for public use; (d) without just compensation. 
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would be to reform the judgment of condemnation to show that UDOT owns the intended parcel 
rather than the one that was originally included. Under either possibility, UDOT has paid just 
compensation for the property-an element that would defeat the Plaintiffs claim. 
It is possible that the Plaintiff is arguing that the mere assertion by UDOT that it owns the 
included parcel that may eventually be awarded to the Plaintiff due to a mistake in the judgment 
is, itself, a unconstitutional taking. However, the Court concludes that it is not. To state a claim 
for an unconstitutional taking, the Plaintiff must own the property being taken. Utah Const, art. 1 
§ 22. At this time, UDOT owns the property. Until the Plaintiff proves that title to the property 
should belong to it, UDOT's assertion of ownership is appropriate. Therefore, the Court 
dismisses the Plaintiif s unconstitutional taking claim 
Because the Com! conclude^ that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim loi an 
unconstitutional taking, the Court will not consider UDOT's argument that the Plaintiffs 
unconstitutional taking is invalid because it depends on 78-12-22 when 78-12-22 is not 
applicable. 
Ms. Lui will prepare an order for the Court's signature. 
Dated this 1~ day of July, 2007 
Hi. 
W. Brent West, Judge 
Rdi-<WS" 
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The Court grants the Defendant's Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings in regards to 
the Plaintiffs claim for adverse possession of property The Court finds that the Plaintiff cannot 
obtain title, to the property in question, in this case, tlirough adverse possession Applicable Utah 
statutory law does not allow a party to adversely posses State owned land See Section 78-12-13 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
in a pnor Ruling dated July 2, 2UU/, the Uouit simply couidn t tell whether the Plaintiit s 
complaint to quiet title was based on adverse possession of the property by the Plaintiff or the 
Defendant's failure to record its purchase of property in a timely fashion It gave the Plaintiff the 
benefit of the doubt and assumed both claims were being alleged At that time, it dismissed the 
Plaintiffs claim for the Defendant's failure to record in a timely fashion, but, did not dismiss the 
Plaintiffs claim for adverse possession Now that the case has progressed and the issues are 
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crystalizing, the Defendant has filed another motion specifically addressing the issue of adverse 
possession. The Court agrees with the Defendant. 
Defense counsel will please prepare an Order, consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this 5th day of June, 2008. 
Judge W Brent West 
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